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THE GOVERNANCE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT AT A CROSSROAD: IS AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS 
THE WAY FORWARD? 
 
Nicolás M. Perrone* 
 
This article makes the claim that the present efforts to reform the international investment 
regime will not save this field from the existing criticism. Given the plural values at issue, it is 
unlikely that states—let alone local populations—will ever reach a consensus on the 
substantive questions surrounding foreign investment. Historically, the main characteristic of 
foreign investment governance has in fact been the lack of multilateral consensus. This field 
remained dominated by diplomacy and customary international law until bilateral treaties and 
investment arbitration consolidated as the leading mechanism to resolve investment disputes in 
the 1990s. This highly legalised regime, however, has been subject to criticism from developing 
and now increasingly from developed countries. Most reform proposals yet fail to go beyond 
alternatives that have been unsuccessful in the past, such a multilateral investment agreement 
or state-to-state arbitration. This article takes a different approach to foreign investment 
governance starting from its political economy. It claims that the international investment 
regime does not depoliticise foreign investment relations but rather promotes the politics of 
foreign investors’ private property protection. Relying on property theory and pluralism as 
heuristic tools, this article analyses the resistance to investment arbitration, the obstacles to 
multilateral cooperation, and the possibility of an overlapping consensus on the basic 
institutions to govern foreign investment. 
 
 What is at issue is the degree of freedom that should be allowed the multinational corporation 
or the nature and extent of regulation that should be imposed on its present operations and 
future growth in order to make it better serve divergent national interests. 
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remain mine only. 
1 U.S. Department of Commerce, “The Multinational Corporation—An Overview,” in Multinational Corporations, 
a compendium of papers published by the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, 21 February, 1973, p. 42. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2514433 
2 
 
The mismatch between the global corporate reality and national political authorities is a central 
issue in economic regulation. Multinational corporations (MNCs) are active in different countries 
and view the world as a single market to do business. They are involved in the production of 
natural resources, outsource many of their activities, and sell final products globally. National 
political authorities may attempt to regulate any of these activities for a public purpose. But they 
are unable to tackle the entire business structure or the global value chain. This can create two 
kinds of political tensions. On the one hand, there is a potential problem of distribution of 
benefits between MNCs and the different host states. An area where this is clear is international 
taxation, where MNCs can rely on different tax planning tools such as transfer pricing. On the 
other hand, there is a constant tension between the global and local perspective. What local 
communities expect of foreign economic activities may be quite different from a maximum 
effective utilization of economic resources.  
 This mismatch between economic activity and political authority has attracted much attention 
from governments as well as the literature in international relations, international law and 
international economics.2 In 1969, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
predicted that the “problems of conflicting jurisdictions and of regulation in the public interest 
will [...] lead inevitably to international agreement and perhaps to international machinery for 
administration.”3 But despite the large academic and governmental interest, there has been a 
systemic lack of multilateral consensus on the governance of foreign investment. Most 
governance initiatives of MNC activity today are based on voluntary corporate social 
responsibility initiatives.4 
 The situation of MNCs, paradoxically, has attracted much less attention. State activity 
nonetheless can undermine foreign investors’ use of resources if each country follows a 
particular regulatory philosophy aimed at materialising social goals as different as economic 
growth and community welfare. What is interesting is that while there is little regulation for 
MNCs at a global scale, there are several international legal tools in place that MNCs can use to 
supervise and discipline state activity. The international business lobby demanded and obtained 
the establishment of international mechanisms for the protection of foreign investment, while 
                                                 
2 Rehbinder, Eckard, “The Foreign Direct Investment Regulations: A European Legal Point of View,” Law and 
Contemporary Problems 34.1 (1969): 95-117; Vagts, Detlev “The multinational enterprise: A new challenge for 
transnational law,” Harvard Law Review (1970): 739-792. 
3 Solomon, Anthony, “Foreign Investment Controls: Policy and Response,” Law and Contemporary Problems 34.1 
(1969), p. 125. 
4 The most important of these initiatives is the U.N. Global Compact. See www.unglobalcompact.org/. 
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convincing states that social and environmental issues should remain regulated at a domestic 
level.5 
 The paradigm of these mechanisms is investment arbitration, a dispute resolution mechanism 
for foreign investment disputes that operates according to international treaties for the 
protection of foreign investment. Most of these treaties are bilateral (BITs) and deal only with 
protection, although this tendency is changing and foreign investment liberalisation is being 
introduced in recent free trade agreements. Presently, the network of investment treaties includes 
more than 3,000 agreements.6 The literature concurs that these treaties, despite some differences 
between them, constitute a regime with common “principles, norms, rules and decision making 
procedures.”7 The relevance acquired by the international investment regime (IIR) in the last two 
decades is mainly a result of investment arbitration. Investment treaties empower MNCs to sue 
host states directly before international arbitral tribunals, without exhausting local remedies or 
requesting the espousal of their home states. These tribunals are empowered to review the 
behaviour of the host state, considering whether it breached the standards of protection 
incorporated in the applicable treaty.  
 It is possible to characterise the IIR within the trend of private international empowerment vis-
à-vis national states. Investment treaties impose obligations to every signatory country, and these 
obligations only refer to standards of foreign investment protection. Since the inception of the 
IIR, however, developed countries only identified themselves with the role of home states.8 
Large corporations based on their territories and owned by national individuals were competing 
for raw materials and markets in the new postcolonial world. These investors needed security 
against the political authority of newly independent countries. Signing investment treaties was a 
way to facilitate the calculability of western business in foreign countries. Since developing 
countries were not expecting a sudden outflow of capital towards the developed world, 
                                                 
5 Stiglitz, Joseph, “Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of Cross-Border Legal Framework in 
a Globalized World. Balancing Rights with Responsibilities,” American University International Law Review 23 (2007), 
pp. 466-469; Levy, David and Aseem Prakash, “Bargains old and new: Multinational corporations in global 
governance,” Business and Politics 5.2 (2003): 131-150. 
6 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development (New York and 
Geneva: United Nations, 2013), p. xix. 
7 Salacuse, Jeswald, “The Emerging Global Regime for Investment,” Harvard International Law Journal 51 (2010), p. 
431; Schneiderman, David, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization. Investment Rules and Democracy’s Promise (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 26. 
8 Miles, Kate The origins of international investment law: empire, environment, and the safeguarding of capital (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 2-3; Sornarajah, M., “Power and justice in foreign investment arbitration,” 
Journal of International Arbitration 14.3 (1997): 103-140. 
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investment treaties represented an asymmetric consensus that was “one-sidedly extended to 
developing countries.”9 
 The asymmetric structure of the IIR began to change only recently when developed states had 
to appear before investment tribunals as respondents. According to UNCTAD, 27% of the 
investment arbitrations in 2013 were initiated against developed states.10 This is a result of two 
central developments. First, MNCs are not coming any longer from western developed countries 
only but from China, Brazil, India, Russia and several other nations. This new political economy 
breaks the de facto asymmetry of the regime, as China for instance has rapidly developed a new 
investment treaty program.11 Second, the international business lobby has pushed the IIR 
structure beyond its original postcolonial roots, i.e. beyond the original asymmetric character. 
After the creation of NAFTA, it became clear that investment arbitration not only served for 
Canadian and U.S. American corporations to sue Mexico, but also for these foreign investors to 
sue the United States and Canada.12  
 As the asymmetric structure of the IIR fades, this article will argue that the original consensus 
for the proliferation of investment treaties may come to an end too. While the international 
business and legal lobby continues to push for investment arbitration in every possible economic 
deal, governments and civil societies no longer only from Ecuador, Venezuela or Bolivia but 
now also from Australia, France and Germany begin to reconsider this regime, or at least, to 
reconsider whether they want to continue moving towards a universal model of investment 
protection.13 Many actors in developed states did not worry about investment arbitration until 
very recently because this mechanism was meant to facilitate corporate control of resources in 
other latitudes; it was a problem of others. But as the North v. South dynamic of foreign 
investment changes, actors in the developed world are beginning to think about the IIR in Private 
v. Public terms: a side of the struggle that has concerned developing countries for many years. 
 The generalisation of the resistance and discontent about the IIR is a recent phenomenon, and 
may be indicating the decay of this regime or, at least, an increasing space for contestation and 
                                                 
9 Andersson, Thomas, Multinational investment in developing countries: a study of taxation and nationalization (New York: 
Routledge, 1991), p. 11. 
10 UNCTAD, “Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS),” IIA Issues Note 1, April 2014, 
p. 7. 
11 Gallagher, Norah and Wenhua Shan, Chinese investment treaties: policies and practice (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009). 
12 For the cases files against the United States, see http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3741.htm. For the cases filed against 
Canada, see http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-
diff/gov.aspx?lang=eng. 
13 See Jandhyala, Srividya; Witold J. Henisz and Edward D. Mansfield, “Three Waves of BITs: The Global Diffusion 
of Foreign Investment Policy,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 55.6: 1047-1073. 
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change.14 Back are the days of the alleged de facto multilateral consensus. The IIR thus faces three 
potential scenarios. It can overcome the legitimacy crisis, continuing the path envisioned by 
Wälde towards a universal regime applicable to every investor; it can gradually recover its 
asymmetric structure; or it can evolve into a broader institutional framework for the governance 
of foreign investment. This opportunity to reconsider foreign investment governance should not 
be taken lightly. It is one of the few international economic fields where multilateral consensus 
has remained impossible, and it is difficult to think of MNCs as regulated citizens of the world 
without such a multilateral consensus.  
 Rather than engaging in futurology, the objective of this article is to contribute to 
understanding the resistance to the IIR, the obstacles to multilateral cooperation in foreign 
investment affairs, and the realistic space for an overlapping consensus for the governance of 
MNCs. Presently, there are new calls for a multilateral investment regime or for increasing the 
engagement of states in investment litigation. These proposals focus on the consolidation of the 
present structure of the IIR, considering some minor reforms to improve this regime.15 None of 
them, however, begins the analysis with the political economy of foreign investment or the 
purpose that an international regime should pursue. The objective of this article is to start exactly 
at this point, emphasising the relational implications of foreign investment.16 My main argument 
is that the IIR empties foreign investment governance from most political content and purpose 
except for one particular goal: the facilitation of multinational corporate use and benefit of 
resources. This affects any competing local view on the disputes with MNCs. Defenders of the 
IIR claim that the advantage of investment arbitration is the “depolitisation” of foreign 
investment relations.17 By this they mean the reduction of home and host state political 
interference in the enforcement of allegedly clear government commitments.18 As I will show, 
however, the IIR does not eliminate politics but rather consolidates a particular kind of politics: 
the politics of foreign investors’ private property protection.   
                                                 
14 UNCTAD, “Reform of the IIA Regime: Four paths of action and a way forward,” IIA Issue Note 3, June 2014. 
15 Åslund, Anders, “The World Needs a Multilateral Investment Agreement,” Peterson Institute for International 
Economics PB 13-01 (2013); Graugnard, Nicolle, “Toward a multilateral framework for investment,” Columbia FDI 
Perspectives 103 (2013); Hufbauer, Gary and Sherry Stephenson, “The case for a framework agreement on 
investment,” Columbia FDI Perspectives 116 (2013); Roberts, Anthea, “State-to-State Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority,” Harvard International 
Law Journal 55.1 (2014): 1-70.  
16 Kennedy, David, “The Mystery of Global Governance,” in Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman, Ruling the world?: 
constitutionalism, international law, and global governance (New York : Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 77. 
17 Broches, Aron, “Settlement of Investment Disputes,” in Aron Broches, Selected Essays: World Bank, ICSID and 
Other Subjects of Public and Private International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), pp. 161, 163; 
Shihata, Ibrahim, “Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA,” 
ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal 1.1 (1986): 1-25. 
18 Elkins, Zachary, Andrew Guzman and Beth Simmons, “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 1960-2000,” International Organization 60 (2006), p. 834. 
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 The second section of this article will describe the governance conundrum of foreign 
investment. It will show that the activity of multinational corporations brings about very delicate 
issues for host countries and populations and that these issues have most in common with the 
problems that private property rights create at the domestic level in terms of both state authority 
and democracy. The third section will make a historical analysis of the long record of multilateral 
disagreements on foreign investment. This will serve as the starting point to consider the 
structure and politics of the IIR. The fourth section will rely on the late Rawls to consider the 
possibility of reaching an overlapping consensus on the basic political institutions to govern the 
problems created by MNCs. This approach can coexist with a plurality of equally valid ideas on 
property and the use of resources. This section will illustrate some of the challenges for this 
strategy looking at the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The article will conclude by stressing 
that the IIR puts local populations in a state of vulnerability vis-à-vis foreign investors, promoting 
anxiety and distrust among states and civil society. It will suggest that a broader institutional 
structure can help politics recover its necessary place in the governance of foreign investment. 
 
II. The political economy of foreign investment: A question of private property and 
foreign ownership 
 
Most of the contentious issues that foreign investment creates relate to the control of resources 
in host countries, including natural resources, infrastructure and means of production. Many 
countries have natural resources and some of the necessary conditions to develop their 
economies. They lack, however, the capital and technology to use those resources. When the 
issue is put in these terms, the solution seems quite straightforward: bring the capital and the 
technology from abroad. This solution, however, does come with a cost: “Private investors 
invest to make profits and not for reasons of benevolence.”19 MNCs are only likely to invest in a 
country when there is a prospect of profitability and they can ensure the control of the key 
resources comprising the investments. Private property rights are essential for any business plan 
because they legally transfer the control of the resources from host states or local individuals to 
foreign investors. A private property system is—as Lipson remarks—a necessary step to tap 
foreign investors’ energies.20 In this regard, if the expansion of foreign private investment is to be 
                                                 
19 Akinsanya, Adeoye, “International Protection of Direct Foreign Investments in the Third World,” The International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 36 (1987), p. 58. 
20 Lipson, Charles, Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1985), pp. 8-19. 
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equated with the development of capitalism beyond national borders, institutional economics 
unanimously anticipates the centrality of the internationalisation of private property rights.21 
 The problems that foreign investment creates in host countries are analytically similar to those 
created by the private ownership of resources. The conflict between foreign investors, host states 
and local population is not considerably different when the investors are domestic.22 This does 
not mean that the foreign character of an investor can be ignored because, in fact, it often tends 
to exacerbate the problems created by private property.23 But the bases to consider the political 
economy of foreign investment should be those of private property, properly complemented 
with the relevance of the foreign elements, including the role of home states.   
 Private property is always in tension with sovereignty and democracy. This tension is caused by 
the authority that property rights vest on the owners of resources, in particular of key and 
strategic resources.24 Property rules govern the relation between individuals regarding the use and 
benefit of resources, and these rules are good against the entire world. Private property grants 
the owner the authority not only to use and benefit from the resources, i.e. to control them, but 
also to exclude other individuals and the state from interfering with this use. According to legal 
realism, the right to exclude represents the coercion that property rules impose on the rest of the 
social actors, whether private or public.25 In this line of argument, granting property rights to 
foreign investors implies a passive obligation for the state not to interfere with the foreign 
investor’s use of the resources, and an active obligation to police any individual who interferes 
with that use without the consent of the foreign investor. As Cohen observes, the character of 
property as power may be obscured by the premise that economic transactions are based on 
consent, e.g. the acquisition of land in the market; however, once control of resources is 
transferred, any owner—including a foreign investor—can dictate the use of the resources.26 
This can create a wide range of conflicts, which are governed by the applicable property laws. 
The central principle of these laws is that private property and the private use of the resources 
are not absolute. For states and local populations, retaining some control over the use of 
                                                 
21 See North, Douglas, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), p. 21; Olstrom, 
Elinor and Edella Schlager, “The Formation of Property Rights,” in Susan Hanna, Carl Folke and Karl-Göran Mäler 
(Eds.), Rights to Nature: ecological, economic, cultural, and political principles of institutions for the environment (Washington, D.C.: 
Island Press, 1996), p. 137. 
22 Stiglitz, Joseph, “Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of Cross-Border Legal Framework in 
a Globalized World. Balancing Rights with Responsibilities,” pp. 463-470. 
23 Ibid., p. 470.  
24 Cohen, Morris, “Property and Sovereignty,” Cornell Law Quarterly 13.8 (1927-1928), pp. 11-14. 
25 Hale, Robert, “Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,” Political Science Quarterly 38.3 
(1923), p. 471. 
26 Cohen, Morris, “Property and Sovereignty,” p. 12  
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resources is central because the plans of the foreign investor can affect social life, the 
environment and the distribution of the benefits. 
 The environmental and social consequences of the use of resources are closely connected. Very 
often, the environment needs to be severely altered to make economic activities related to 
foreign investment like mining or large-scale agriculture possible. Such changes can have 
important social repercussions. The capital-intensive production of crops for instance will affect 
a local and independent group of peasants, who may be pushed to begin working as employees 
for the large undertakings. This project may create some well-paid jobs locally but it can also 
exacerbate overall poverty and inequality, worsening the living standards of the majority.27  
 The dominion granted by property can be consequently equated in many ways to the notion of 
sovereignty. The transfer of control over resources to foreign investors necessarily implies a 
cession of authority that goes beyond the mere development of particular projects. Barnet and 
Muller note that “in the course of their daily business [MNCs] make decisions with more impact 
on the lives of ordinary people than most generals and politicians.”28 Local populations will 
predictably react when these decisions have negative consequences for them, urging host states 
to protect their interests and alternative views on the use of resources.29  
 What follows is that for domestic democracy to be consistent with foreign investors’ property 
rights, the principles of political determination and security of private property need to be 
balanced. There is no such thing as absolute property rights or absolute democracy, as 
Montesquieu and Madison already noted in the 18th century. The tension between private 
property and democracy is the most important topic in any constitutional property debate. For 
property defenders, private property promotes democracy as it allows individuals to exercise 
their autonomy, facilitating economic transactions. This view is promoted by the World Bank, 
for instance, that consistently relates private property with democracy and the rule of law.30 This 
position, however, is in the best of the cases shortsighted. Realist and progressive scholars have 
clearly demonstrated that states and communities maintain an inherent interest in the use of the 
resources and the distribution of benefits, not because they do not want to respect individual 
property, but because the use of those resources can affect the individual autonomy of the non-
                                                 
27 Perrone, Nicolás, “Restrictions to foreign acquisitions of agricultural land in Argentina and Brazil,” Globalizations 
10.1 (2013): 205-209. 
28 Barnet, Richard and Ronald Muller, Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1974), p. 214. 
29 See TECMED v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003; and Aguas del Tunari v Bolivia, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3. 
30 Waldron, Jeremy, The rule of law and the measure of property (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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owners and the community life.31 Property is a political and relational concept that incorporates 
“ideas about ethics, justice, morality, or any other values and goals.”32 
 When describing the problems that private property in the hands of foreign investors create for 
sovereignty, democracy, and ultimately for local populations, it is necessary to consider the 
importance of the foreignness of the investor. This includes examining both foreign investors 
and home states. Historically, foreign investors have been identified with the national interest of 
their home states. In 1935, Staley described a world where “diplomacy serve[d] investments” and 
“investments serve[d] diplomacy.”33 During the post-colonial context, MNCs were still 
considered agents of their home countries that served to maintain the economic dependency of 
the former colonies.34 These corporations were a tool to consolidate a distribution of labour 
where developing countries produced natural resources and developed countries manufactured 
industrial goods. In reaction to this dominant view, many developing states decided to limit 
foreign investment in natural resources. A number of other countries implemented similar or 
even more stringent policies. During this period, Japan, South Korea and Finland remained quite 
closed to foreign investment, while France and Canada adopted measures concerned with the 
superiority of U.S. MNCs.35  
 Based on the policy changes in Canada, Bergsten in 1974 predicted “coming investment 
wars.”36 In the following years, countries certainly struggled in relation to foreign investment, but 
the struggle was not so much for or against liberalisation but for the attraction of MNCs. In few 
years, foreign investment became very welcome and desired. The main reason for this shift was a 
rapid change of perception regarding multinational corporate activity. What in the 1960s and 
1970s was considered problematic for development became by the end of the 1980s—hand in 
hand with neoliberalism—one of the essentials recipes for the very same goal.37  
 Part of this change arguably responded to the increasing detachment of MNCs from their 
home states. The world of global value chains and economic globalisation that Reich, and 
Stopford and Strange describe as a consolidated trend in the 1990s effectively contrasts with the 
                                                 
31 Alexander, Gregory, The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings jurisprudence (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 1-7. 
32 Lehavi, Amnon, “The Global Law Of The Land,” University of Colorado Law Review 81 (2010), p. 469. 
33 Staley, Eugene, War and The Private Investor: A Study in the Relations of International Politics and International Private 
Investment (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1935), Chapters 3, 6. 
34 Gilpin, Robert, Global political economy: understanding the international economic order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), pp. 286-288. 
35 Chang, Ha-Joon, “Regulation of foreign investment in historical perspective,” The European Journal of Development 
Research 16.3 (2004): 687-715; Servan-Schreiber, Jean, The American challenge (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969); 
Globerman, Steven and Daniel Shapiro, “The Impact of Government Policies on Foreign Direct Investment: The 
Canadian Experience,” Journal of International Business Studies 30 (1999): 513-532. 
36 Bergsten, Fred, “Coming investment wars?,” Foreign Affairs (1974): 135-152. 
37 Dunning, John and Sarianna Lundan, Multinational enterprises and the global economy (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, 
MA: Edward Elgar, 2008), p. 675. 
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picture provided by Staley back in 1935.38 This trend should not be exaggerated, however, 
because MNCs continue to be socially and culturally embedded in their home states.39 What it is 
true is that the interests of these firms can presently diverge substantially from those of the home 
state. Today, multinational corporate plans transcend the nation-state and its interests, 
constituting “the first institution in human history dedicated to central planning on a world 
scale.”40 
 This change of perception on MNCs had implications for the regulation of foreign investment 
at the private property level. The fierce competition for foreign investment triggered a large 
number of regulatory changes. Most governments around the world unilaterally reversed many 
of the restrictive measures adopted in previous decades. UNCTAD data shows that 94% of the 
changes in foreign investment policies between 1992 and 2003 (1771 out of 1885) were 
liberalising and protective rather than restrictive.41 The signature of investment treaties expanded 
at a rapid pace during this period, under the auspices of a “Grand Bargain” by which host states 
granted foreign investors international protection in exchange for the possibility to increase the 
inflow of capital.42 As these neoliberal reforms were implemented, few governments paid 
attention to the warnings regarding the social and environmental risks involved with foreign 
investment.43 The extensive authority granted to foreign investors according to the treaties—
much of it in the form of strong property rights—was going to have profound effects for states 
and local populations, announcing the long series of disputes that twenty years later investment 
arbitrators are presently adjudicating. 
 
III. From multilateral disagreement to the BITs rush: Depolitisation or the politics of 
private property protection?  
 
                                                 
38 Reich, Robert, The Work of nations: preparing ourselves for 21st century capitalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1992); 
Stopford, John and Susan Strange, Rival states, rival firms: Competition for world market shares (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). 
39 Razeen, Sally, “Multinational enterprises, political economy and institutional theory: domestic embeddedness in 
the context of internationalization,” Review of International Political Economy 1 (1994): 161-192. 
40 Kobrin, Stephen, “Multinational Corporations, the Protest Movement, and the Future of Global Governance,” in 
Alfred Chandler Jr. and Bruce Mazlish (Eds.), Leviathans: Multinational corporations and the new global history (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 224. 
41 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004: The Shift Towards Services (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2004), 
p. 8. 
42 Salacuse, Jeswald and Nicholas Sullivan, “Do BITs really work: An evaluation of bilateral investment treaties and 
their grand bargain,” Harvard. International Law Journal 46 (2005): 67-130. 
43 See Lall, Sanjaya, “Multinational enterprises and developing countries: some issues for research in the 1990s,” 
Millennium 20.2 (1991): 251-255; Reich, Simon, “Roads to follow: regulating direct foreign investment,” International 
Organization 43.4 (1989): 543-584.   
11 
 
Historically, foreign investment has not been a peaceful domain. Investment disputes have led to 
expropriations, coup d’états and military interventions. Although only some foreign investment 
ends in turmoil, tensions between global corporate and local interests are latent and when the 
issues do escalate, they normally become political and difficult to resolve. No government wants 
to be seen accepting demands by foreign investors, in particular when was at stake is a large land 
reform, the cultural industry or a historical reparation initiative, and they may rely on their 
sovereign powers to turn the situation in their favour. Foreign investors reasonably demand 
protection against this political risk, and in the event of a dispute would not hesitate to employ 
their economic power or to recur to their home states.  
 The large record of foreign investment disputes contrasts, interestingly, with the lack of 
international institutions in this field. If foreign investment disputes have been a concern for 
both developed and developing countries, the persistent multilateral disagreement and the 
inexistence of an international institution indicate how difficult it is to organise the governance 
of foreign investment. While developing countries have resisted some of the initiatives, which 
essentially aimed to protect foreign investment, other attempts in favour of a broader 
institutionalisation—such as the U.N. Code of Conduct on MNCs—were blocked by developed 
countries. On other occasions, developed countries at the OECD were unable to reach a 
consensus on their own terms.44 
 The list of disagreements begins in the 19th century with the Calvo Doctrine, according to 
which developing countries asserted that domestic laws govern foreign investment and eventual 
disputes should be decided before domestic courts. This position opposed the views of 
developed countries based on a doctrine firstly enunciated by Grotius and Vattel during the 16th 
and 17th centuries. In essence, the doctrine of diplomatic protection recognises an interest of 
home states over the property rights of their citizens in foreign countries, and this interest 
authorises home states to initiate legal proceedings at the international level and according to 
international law.  
 In the wake of the 20th century, the only international consensus was that countries should 
resolve foreign investment disputes peacefully. Home states were precluded to use force as long 
as host countries accepted to submit the dispute to international litigation (Drago-Porter 
Convention of 1907). The creation of the League of Nations did not imply any progress in this 
area. The only outcome of the conferences held at The Hague in 1930 was the confirmation of 
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the lack of consensus between developed and developing countries on most substantive issues.45 
Like most international economic topics, the matter was back on the agenda at the end of the 
Second World War. These negotiations were shaped by a positive view—mainly among 
developed nations—on the creation of international institutions to govern international trade, 
investment, finance and development. Trade and investment negotiations concluded with a draft 
of the Havana Treaty, whose main purpose was to create the International Trade Organisation. 
But as developed nations reached a consensus on trade with the conclusion of the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), foreign investment proved to be again controversial. 
The GATT had no disciplines on this area, and the United States rejected the Havana Treaty due 
to the opposition of the business lobby to the foreign investment chapter. The regulation of 
foreign investment was the only part of Bretton Woods project that came to nothing.46  
 The negotiations for a multilateral understanding on foreign investment did continue but only 
to suffer one failure after the other. Developing countries persisted in opposing most initiatives, 
while developed countries blocked any alternative project, and could not reach a consensus 
among themselves. In the 1960s, the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) negotiated and approved the Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property. 
Despite the common views of developed countries, some differences among OECD members 
impeded the signature of a multinational convention based on this draft.47 In the meanwhile, 
developing countries pushed for an alternative model for foreign investment governance. Their 
objective was a regime that focuses less on protection and more on the problems that foreign 
investment can create for host countries and local populations. Developing countries channelled 
their voice through the United Nations, passing the resolutions on the Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources in 1962, and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States in 
1974. These resolutions were not binding—as every General Assembly resolution—and 
developed countries strongly objected to their content, in particular, to the Charter of Economic 
Rights.48 
 Foreign investment reappeared on the multilateral agenda during the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT. Again, despite the substantial consensus that led to the creation of the WTO, states did 
not reach any major consensus on foreign investment issues. The only exception was a relatively 
minor agreement on trade measures related to investments. After 1995, foreign investment 
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remained on the agenda of the WTO only for a short period. It was discussed during the Doha 
Development Road, but abandoned at the Cancun Ministerial Meeting in 2003.49 In the 
meantime, developed countries tried to reach a consensus of their own within the framework of 
the OECD. This strategy followed the premise that the disagreement on foreign investment is a 
North v South debate. Yet, as had already happened in the 1960s, some developed countries 
opposed to the conclusion of the Multilateral Investment Agreement (MIA) in a scenario of 
rising civil society pressure due to the potential risks that this initiative posed to environmental 
protection.50    
 This systematic lack of consensus, despite the importance of the problem, is explicable when 
the focus of foreign investment rules has been placed on facilitating multinational corporate 
activity and obstructing change in host countries. In other words, this lack of consensus makes 
sense if we thing about these rules as property rules. The resistance of Latin American countries 
was not only a question of preserving sovereignty in the abstract. In 1968, Metzger noted that 
the views of Mexico during the land reform of the early 20th century were understandable given 
that foreign investment rules constituted an obstacle to change, which amounted to a total 
barrier “if foreign investors were dominant.”51 The situation is not so different when we move to 
developed countries. French and Canadian resistance to the application of the MIA to their 
cultural industry is based on a similar concern. This industry works under premises that are 
different from those of the main MNCs in this sector, and these countries are aware that 
facilitating the activity of the latter could eventually affect the premises that support their cultural 
industry. Once MNCs become dominant, there will not be a space to change. As Schneiderman 
has recently put it, “[a] pluralistic understanding of civilisations would be buried beneath the 
weight of [this] international law project.”52 
 Until the 1990s, in any case, foreign investment disputes remained governed by contracts and 
general international law. A review of the literature between the 1960s-1980s demonstrates that 
most foreign investment disputes were resolved through contractual means, i.e. arbitrations 
contracts, and according to general international law.53 This does not mean that during this 
period there were no international developments in the governance of foreign investment. 
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Beginning in 1959, many European countries signed BITs with former colonies, inaugurating a 
trend that continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, the World Bank sponsored 
the negotiation of the Convention for the creation of the International Centre for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes in (ICSID), which was finally approved by the minimum number of 
countries in 1966, despite the opposition of Latin American countries. 
 But both BITs and the ICSID remained dormant for 30 years. At the beginning of the 1980s, 
there were less than 250 BITs and only 9 registered disputes registered at the ICSID. The main 
foreign investment disputes of that time, involving countries such as Libya, Kuwait and Iran, 
were resolved outside of ICSID and according to general international law. This picture 
completely changed during the 1990s. In the period 1994-1996, states were signing an average of 
4 BITs per week. Today, the amount of bilateral, regional and sector-specific investment treaties 
exceeds 3,000. The caseload of the ICSID reflects this boom. In 1997, the number of cases 
registered per year had reached 10, and since 2000, the annual average has remained well above 
20 (50 in 2012). Most controversial disputes of this period, involving countries such as 
Argentina, Ecuador and Venezuela, have been resolved within the IIR, i.e. through investment 
arbitration and according to investment treaties.54  
 This scenario led some authors in the middle of the 2000s to argue that most states had 
reached a kind of de facto multilateral consensus on foreign investment.55 It is indisputable that 
during a brief period many states literally rushed to sign treaties with as many countries as 
possible. There is some evidence, however, that many states were not fully aware of the legal 
consequences of those treaties.56 Rather than a consensus on the content of the IIR, then, the 
signature of the treaties reflects the foreign investment rush of the 1990s and the dominance of 
neoliberal ideas. The Grande Bargain of protection for foreign investment was highly embedded 
in the Washington consensus, which promoted private property protection as a central part of a 
one size fits all development approach. But the Washington consensus did not do very well in 
the field of foreign investment. Many studies have shown that BITs do not increase foreign 
investment flows or have at best only limited effects, while the relationship between these flows 
and development is unclear.57 If there ever was a de facto multilateral consensus, it was a very brief 
one.  
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 In addition, as some scholars had warned, the retreat of the state in the regulation of foreign 
investment quickly translated into increasing disputes and discontent in host countries and local 
populations. The rise of neoliberalism brought about increasing criticism against international 
economic institutions across the board. The WTO, the IMF and the World Bank were under 
strong pressure in the late 1990s and early 2000s, although they have managed to overcome 
much of the legitimacy crisis by now. The situation of the IIR is slightly different because this 
regime has been by far and large the most criticised in the recent years, and there remains 
considerable resistance to its present structure and expansion.  
 The denunciation of ICSID by Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador are important indicators of the 
relevance of this criticism, as are the decisions of Australia, the Czech Republic, South Africa 
and recently Indonesia to modify, denounce or stop signing investment treaties.58 This criticism 
does not indicate a decay of the IIR, however, because some level of resistance is inherent to the 
political game. But what is different about the current crisis in the IIR is the increasing criticism 
in developed countries after these states have become subject to a few investment arbitrations. 
In other words, it was to be expected to see Ecuador or Venezuela criticising the effects of 
investment treaties, after all they are the others, but it is certainly a new development to see 
Europe and particularly Germany resisting the inclusion of an investment chapter in the 
Transatlantic Agreement.59 This attitude of developed countries could be a signal of a large 
change of circumstances because investment treaties allegedly incorporate the preferences of 
these countries.  
 In this regard, current developments in investment treaty making show some of the main 
proponents of investment treaties and arbitration slightly shifting their discourse towards the 
IIR, trying to reconstitute its original asymmetric structure. This strategy aims to reverse the 
universalisation of the IIR in a move that would equal to making the GATT applicable to ‘other’ 
countries only.  
 There is substantial evidence of this strategy. First, the only FTA the United States have signed 
in recent years without an investment chapter was with Australia. The explicit reason for this 
decision was that countries with developed and trustworthy legal systems did not need 
investment arbitration.60 Second, the existing debate in the European Union shows that 
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according to the Commission and some member states such a regime is not needed within 
Europe. The incorporation of the Eastern European countries implies their adherence to 
acceptable principles of law.61 Third, the inclusion of an investment chapter in the future 
Transatlantic Agreement is gaining new and new detractors. These are not the usual suspects 
only, such as environmental NGOs or the government of France. They include, for instance, the 
libertarian CATO Institute.62 The philosophy behind this ‘change of mind’ is summarised well in 
one of the latest documents issues by UNCTAD: 
 
In that context, questions arise about the rationale for including ISDS  [investment 
arbitration] into IIAs—or other agreements—between developed countries with 
sophisticated regulatory and legal systems, and with generally open investment 
environments. Originally, the primary purpose of IIAs was the provision of legal 
protection to foreign investors, including through ISDS [investment arbitration], hence 
addressing concerns that host countries’ domestic legal systems may not be advanced 
enough to ensure due process, fair and non discriminatory treatment and adequate 
compensation for expropriation.63 
 
 The position of the EU and some key U.S. actors carry a great deal of either inconsistency or 
hypocrisy.64 If these countries want the IIR to consolidate as a way to favour their MNCs, why 
do they resist the incorporation of investment arbitration in their own economic treaties? In 
theory, they should have nothing to fear. A leading arbitrator affirmed in a lecture at 
Georgetown in 2005 that the only objective of the IIR is to discipline host states that do not 
comply with their commitments and the rule of law.65 To a great extent, this message has been 
repeated in most investment awards. No tribunal claims to be affecting host state legitimate 
authority to regulate.66 Assuming that the EU is aware of the negative consequences their 
position may have on the future of the IIR, it is worth reflecting about the reasons behind the 
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opposition of some of its members regarding investment arbitration in the negotiations of a 
Transatlantic Agreement. 
  More than a question of paying compensation to a particular investor, I claim that what 
populations in developed (and developing countries) fear is that MNCs can use investment 
arbitration to impose their views on the use of resources, defeating their democracies and any 
possibility of pluralism. Their fear then is the ‘depolitisation’ of private property. Many authors 
have emphasised that the main strength of the IIR is precisely its depolitisation. Before, the field 
of foreign investment disputes was the domain of diplomatic relations, political intervention, and 
state-to-state dispute settlement. This position is not without merit. A problem faced by MNCs 
in the 1960s and 1970s was the allegation that they were agents of home states, and obviously the 
fact that any dispute with the host state could end up in a diplomatic intervention only validating 
this allegation. The IIR resolves this problem by giving foreign investors direct standing at the 
international level. Similarly, investment arbitration has been defended by small countries 
because it helps them to prevent foreign interference in domestic affairs. After the establishment 
of an investment arbitration, domestic authorities can always answer a powerful country as the 
United States that the issue has been deferred to an allegedly independent and impartial 
international tribunal.67  
 The problem of this argument is not that investment arbitration has not reduced state authority 
and intervention in foreign investment protection —to this extent, the depolitisation argument is 
not inaccurate. The problem is that this definition of politics and depolitisation is very 
unsatisfactory and it does not capture the essential political character of any regime that governs 
the use of resources. Needless to say, the relational implications of property extend well beyond 
the participation of the state in the protection of private property. 
 Against this background, I propose to analyse the governance implications of the IIR using the 
lens of privatisation. By privatisation of foreign investment governance, I am referring to 
something broader than foreign investors’ international standing and the lower participation of 
home states. Privatisation implies the emergence of a regime that privileges the position of 
MNCs, and relies on their expectations on the uses and benefits of resources to discipline host 
states. Three characteristics of the IIR support this claim of privatisation. International 
arbitration, i.e. litigation and not political cooperation, is the central and only institutional 
mechanism of the IIR; foreign investment disputes are resolved from an individual micro-
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perspective that focuses only on property protection; the IIR increases foreign investors’ and 
arbitrators’ authority vis-à-vis host and home states.  
 First, the IIR is a highly legalised regime where political representation and cooperation is 
absent. In institutional terms, the only solution that this regime provides is litigation, and this 
litigation has remained thus far limited to claims initiated by foreign investors. This means that 
the main input of the legal proceedings always comes from MNCs. Such a model shares most in 
common with a new medieval type of governance because the political role of states is quite 
modest, being limited to the negotiation or renegotiation of treaties.68 Second, the IIR focuses 
essentially on the protection of foreign investors’ rights, whereas the impact of foreign 
investment on the community has been left to domestic legal orders. Given the prevalence of 
international over domestic law, this ends up benefiting foreign investors’ perspective on the 
conflict. This perspective is also favoured by the inter-partes model of adjudication followed by 
most investment arbitration. Investment arbitration borrows from commercial arbitration an 
individual micro-perspective on  the disputes.69 Third, investment arbitration operates as a 
transnational tribunal. Arbitrators are more autonomous from governments and more dependent 
on foreign investors because they rely on the latter to exercise their jurisdiction. This leads Tai-
Cheng to conclude that investment arbitration implies a strong redistribution of power from 
states to foreign investors and investment arbitrators.70 Such redistribution is significant because 
investment treaties deal with incomplete foreign investors’ rights and mainly incorporate vague 
and ambiguous protective standards, increasing the scope of arbitral interpretation.  
 It could be argued that empowering investment arbitrators is a positive move for the fair 
decision of foreign investment disputes. Arbitrators are in theory appointed because of their 
independence and impartiality. There are rules in the ICSID that prevent nationals to sit in cases 
where an investor or a state of her nationality is involved. However, a closer look at the situation 
of investment arbitrators shows that there are significant problems with the independence and 
impartiality of arbitrators. First, investment arbitrators have a group interest in the future of 
investment arbitration, and an individual interest in their prospect of future appointments. The 
outcome of the arbitrations, to this extent, is not neutral to their interests particularly at the 
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jurisdictional stage.71 Second, they belong to an international community that has been 
historically involved with the business side of the struggle. International lawyers have promoted 
investment treaties both in the 1960s and in the 1990s.72 More importantly, the main problem of 
investment arbitrators is that their discourse of technical correctness is not consistent with their 
function of resolving property disputes. Decisions regarding private property protection, 
especially in relation to state intervention, are not the outcome of independent technical 
assessments but of normative preferences. Arbitrators cannot be technically correct only because 
the meaning of property is plural and depends on the normative arguments they are convinced 
by.73 
 All in all, the alleged depolitisation of the IIR in reality hides a political message in favour of the 
protection of foreign investors’ private property. In normative terms, the IIR is justified because 
foreign investment protection can lead to the most efficient use of resources, and this would 
eventually improve the living standards of the population.74 But this casual relationship is far 
from clear, and investment arbitration ends up being solely an instrument that MNCs can use to 
monitor and discipline host state behaviour. Foreign investors can rely on investment arbitration 
to punish any “irrational nationalism” affecting global planning and the expected profits.75 On 
the losing side of this regime, inexorably, we find local populations and alternative views on the 
use of resources. In this respect, the evidence shows that investment arbitrators may decide 
disputes in ways different from domestic courts, and this includes the courts of developed legal 
systems.76  
 
IV. A way forward: Governing foreign investment through a political institutional 
structure 
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In 2003, Mann claimed that the IIR is at a crossroad: it can crystallise as a new form of 
colonialism or it can evolve into a new field of global cooperation on development.77 Today, 
many academic circles share the view that the IIR is in need of a change, with proposals ranging 
from the negotiation of a multilateral investment agreement to the recognition of a larger role for 
state-to-state arbitration.78 This recent literature, however, neither refers to the rationale that 
justifies implementing any of these particular initiatives, nor explains why formulas that failed in 
the past will work in the present. Arguably, the starting point for resolving the governance 
problem of foreign investment should be the political economy of the problem, and not the 
multilateralisation of the existing regime or the sound interpretation of the law — something that 
is in itself difficult to determine. Foreign investment creates a series of challenges regarding the 
use of resources, and can have large social, cultural and environmental implications. These are 
political issues whose resolution requires politics and cooperation. In this regard, the literature 
referred to overlooks that global governance in a plural world cannot be achieved through 
litigation only; investment arbitration is simply not enough. 
 Increasing the role of politics in the governance of foreign investment requires the creation of 
political institutions rather than the improvement of dispute resolution mechanisms. Investment 
arbitration cannot create consensus, it can only determine winners and losers. Tribunals, in 
addition, require long periods of time to adapt to new normative views about the subject in 
question. What the governance of foreign investment needs thus is more space for negotiation 
and cooperation, and less litigation, whether it is investor-state or state-to-state. The IIR shows 
that too much legalisation and too little politics is a recipe to increase tensions. Political 
institutions, on the other hand, can narrow down the gaps between winners and losers, and can 
be reworked more easily to cope with emerging tensions. Political bodies can react faster because 
they have a macro-perspective on the situation.79 
 To increase the role of politics in the governance of foreign investment, it is necessary to put 
the emphasis on the existing institutions along the lines argued by the late Rawls.80 They need to 
be reorganised as a way to promote consensus among the different actors involved, and not as a 
means to favour some self or group-interests. The first step to promote politics is to open up 
institutions to dialogue and democratic decision-making. The governance of foreign investment 
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needs a transformation that can be briefly summarised as the opposite of the legalisation of the 
GATT. The difficulty with the governance of international trade in the 1980s was the excessive 
politicization of the GATT. On the contrary, the present problem of the IIR is its excessive 
legalisation. It has plenty of the ethos of lawyers and arbitrators but misses the ethos of 
diplomats and politics more in general.81 This is a cornerstone for higher levels of general trust in 
the governance of international economic affairs.82  
 The creation of this international political structure obviously faces the existing difficulties to 
reach a multilateral consensus on foreign investment. But it is necessary to distinguish here 
between the obstacles to reach a substantive multilateral consensus on the use of the resources 
by MNCs and the difficulties to establish a political forum to discuss and decide policy 
approaches to the challenges posed by MNCs and foreign investment. As Rawls explains, 
reaching an overlapping consensus on significant normative issues is quite difficult domestically, 
let alone internationally. He argues, however, that an overlapping consensus on the institutional 
mechanisms to accommodate conflicting interests is possible.83 In the case of foreign investment 
governance, it becomes almost an imperative. Property is a highly plural concept that enables 
and shapes community life.84 Plural views about property put pressure on the institutions aimed 
to govern foreign investment and, the more plurality of values, the stronger the need for political 
institutions.    
 This line of reasoning could favour the inclusion of foreign investment governance in the 
WTO. This organisation arguably represents a political consensus on the institutional structure 
to govern international trade. But the WTO faces its own challenges today. The difficulties of the 
Doha Round reveal that the members have diverging views about the purpose of this 
organisation and the future of international trade. In this context, introducing the governance of 
foreign investment in the WTO may be a mistake not only because of the impracticality of 
negotiating such a reform, but also because of the challenges that the institutionalisation of 
foreign investment will create.  
 In this regard, there are two central differences between the WTO and the IIR. First, as 
opposed to what happens in the WTO, MNCs have an active role in the IIR. This could change 
in the future but making the institutionalisation of foreign investment governance conditional to 
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such change is not necessary and perhaps not desirable. The recognition of MNCs as subjects of 
international law is not only a matter of rights but also of obligations. Second, the IIR may be a 
regime with some multilateral characteristics, but contrary to the WTO, it is composed by a large 
number of bilateral and regional treaties. An international organisation dedicated to the 
governance of foreign investment will need to administer this entire network of treaties. This is 
arguably possible because of the enormous similarities between the text of the treaties and the 
operation of the MFN clause. However, it is a challenge, and one unique to the governance of 
foreign investment. 
 But the main challenge posed by the institutionalisation of foreign investment governance is 
arguably finding the right balance between the to be created political bodies and investment 
arbitration. The inclusion of more politics clearly does not imply the end of disputes, and thus it 
is necessary to consider which institutional structure would promote the best possible relation 
between the political and dispute resolution bodies. First of all, the dispute resolution mechanism 
should aim to concentrate all foreign investment disputes. The present dispersion of arbitration 
forums responds more to the medieval reality of commercial arbitration than to the global need 
to govern foreign investment. This requires some reorganisation, in particular merging the 
ICSID into the new international organisation. In itself, this would represent a salutary move in 
terms of legitimacy because the voting system of the World Bank is still shaped by the same 
power relations that determined the asymmetric structure of the IIR. In addition, the creation of 
an appellate body makes more sense in this institutional context, as it would facilitate the 
dialogue between the political and jurisdictional bodies in charge of governing foreign 
investment. 
 Gathering the political and dispute resolution bodies in charge of foreign investment under the 
same institutional scope is just the starting point of the institutional challenge. As the WTO 
literature shows, the difficult part is to establish the relation between these two different bodies.85 
The political bodies should discuss issues that are of interest to all the members, remaining 
neutral regarding ongoing investment disputes. By now it is clear that developed and developing 
states face similar challenges in investment arbitration. The arbitrations faced by Argentina due 
to its economic crisis are now repeating again in Greece, Spain and Cyprus. Countries as 
different as Uruguay and Australia are defending themselves against similar claims from Philip 
Morris. And the tensions between international investment law, environmental law and human 
                                                 
85 Roessler, Frieder, “The Institutional Balance Between the Judicial and Political Organs of the WTO,” in Marco 
Bronckers and Reinhard Quick (Eds.) New Directions in International Economic Law. Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson 
(The Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000), p. 325; Bartels, Lorand, “The Separation of Powers in The 
WTO: How To Avoid Judicial Activism,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 53 (2004): 861-895. 
23 
 
rights law are always latent, no matter whether the dispute is against a developed or a developing 
country. Arguably, these issues would be better treated at a macro and political level, rather than 
from a ‘depoliticised’ micro-perspective angle. Drawing from the experience of the WTO, the 
political bodies of an international organisation in charge of foreign investment governance 
could create committees on foreign investment and the environment, foreign investment and 
human rights, and foreign investment and development.       
 The purpose of these discussions should not be to annul the obligations assumed in investment 
treaties but rather to help investment arbitrators to interpret the vague and ambiguous terms of 
the treaties. The Appellate Body of the WTO has accepted the significance of several acts of the 
political bodies for the resolution of concrete disputes. They include the creation of a Committee 
on Trade and Environment,86 the deliberations of the Committee on Balance of Payments,87 and 
the decisions of the Committee on Phytosanitary Measures.88 In fact, the Appellate Body has 
rarely ignored the opinions of the political bodies of the WTO — sometimes even to the 
detriment of progressive goals.89 Following the WTO practice, in addition, a political structure 
for the governance of foreign investment should entitle states to make comments on investment 
awards, inform an eventual appellate body about their concerns, and even have the ability to 
overturn an award by consensus, i.e. the rule of negative consensus. 
 The introduction of politics in foreign investment governance entails both opportunities and 
risks for non-state actors. A political structure would benefit civil society and NGOs, facilitating 
their coordination and action.90 Presently, NGOs can only lobby governments regarding whether 
to sign or reject new investment treaties. The rest of their activities are dispersed among different 
tribunals that are treating similar issues. For the international business lobby, this cannot be seen 
as a negative development either, because it can certainly organise itself around any new 
institutional structure. The outcome would therefore be more plurality of voices in a political—
as opposed to a jurisdictional—environment. 
 The risks posed by the institutionalisation of foreign investment governance are the excessive 
politicisation of the field and the potential lack of independence of investment arbitrators. This 
would be the main concern for foreign investors, and the arbitration and academic community 
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89 Bartels, Lorand, “The Separation of Powers in The WTO: How To Avoid Judicial Activism,” p. 861. 
90 Tarrow, Sidney, “Transnational politics: contention and institutions in international politics,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 4.1 (2001): 1-20. 
24 
 
should remain vigilant in this respect. But I suggest that these risks are much lower in the foreign 
investment than in the trade field. As opposed to what happens in trade, many investment 
arbitrators are high profile international lawyers and academics. Arguably, these individuals will 
be much less prone to accept institutional pressure. There is indeed evidence of the strong 




That the use and benefit of resources is a central issue of governance at both the domestic and 
international level does not strike anybody as contentious. What may seem controversial is that 
the IIR deals with the control of resources of different countries. For many decades, the 
literature has described the IIR as a regime solely aimed to protect foreign investors’ rights. But 
this description is incomplete. The IIR has a direct impact on foreign investors, host states and 
local communities in relation to the use and benefit of resources. From this perspective, those 
who promoted the creation of a broad institutional structure to govern foreign investment and 
MNCs were taking a reasonable path in light of the political economy of the problem. They may 
have failed to realise some of the obstacles to reach such goal, but they were right in asserting 
that MNCs were only going to promote general welfare if there was an international regime in 
place able to strike a balance between multinational corporations, states and local populations. 
 The IIR however is not capable of taking politics seriously. This article has shown that rather 
than opening up a political space for discussing the implications of foreign investment, 
international arbitration only advances the protection of foreign investors’ rights. The IIR puts 
host states and local populations in a situation of vulnerability vis-à-vis foreign investors. This 
purpose made sense to developed countries as long as this regime was only applicable to others. 
But as the asymmetric character of the IIR fades, the resistance to the universalisation of this 
regime is becoming generalised too. While developing countries want to abandon or limit the 
negative consequences of the IIR, developed countries want to support this regime but—as in 
the past—only for others.  
 The current resistance to the IIR opens up a space for imagining alternative regimes to govern 
foreign investment and MNCs. As opposed to the existing IIR, a broader institutional structure 
could constitute the basis for considering the plurality of interests and values involved in the use 
of resources by MNCs. This should arguably be the purpose of any international regime in this 
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field. The institutionalisation of foreign investment governance is certainly not the panacea, and 
the WTO is an example of the kind of problems that lie ahead. The creation of political bodies, 
in this respect, should only be seen as an adequate means to promote cooperation and trust 
among nations in relation to foreign investment. The path to make foreign investment serve 
divergent national interests better is a long and difficult one. It certainly includes, for instance, 
the attempt of some countries to recover their privileged status in the present regime. But we 
should not forget that the moment of highest consensus of the trade system—as Dunoff 
notes—was before the WTO, when the diplomatic ethos dominated the GATT.92 After all, 
consensus is the business of politics.   
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